This article considers the impact of new media on freedom of expression and media freedom within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Through comparative analysis of United States jurisprudence and scholarship this article deals with the following three issues. Firstly, it explores the traditional purpose of the media, and how media freedom, as opposed to freedom of expression, has been subject to privileged protection, within a ECHR context at least. Secondly, it considers the emergence of new media, and how it can be differentiated from the traditional media. Finally, it analyses the philosophical justifications for freedom of expression, and how they enable a workable definition of the media based upon the concept of the media-as-a-constitutional-component.
INTRODUCTION
The media landscape is undergoing profound change, on an unprecedented scale and at an exponential pace, at the forefront of which, is new media 1 15 However, despite a specific free press clause, the US position is very different, and is discussed below. 16 Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153, [59] ; Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, [39] ; Thorgeirson v Iceland (1992) 14 EHRR 843, [63] ; Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125, [62] .
includes the protection of the newspaper distribution infrastructure 32 . The case of Gsell v Switzerland 33 involved restrictions on road access to the World Economic Forum in Davos. Consequently, the Court recognised the existence of protection against state measures that could impinge upon the exercise of the journalist's profession. It has also been held that journalists cannot be made to give evidence concerning confidential information or sources, even if it has been obtained illegally 34 . They are also exempt from certain data protection and copyright provisions 35 . With regard to the positive category, states are required to: protect the media through the safeguarding of media 28 Jersild v Denmark (1995) 19 EHRR 1. 29 54 , as opposed to the source of that expression, whether that emanates from a professional journalist or a casual Twitter user 55 .
In conclusion, within the context of the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence, this section has established that the distinction between the freedom of expression right afforded to private individuals compared with that of non-media institutions, pursuant to media freedom, can be articulated as follows: if the expression emanates from a media entity, whether that be a journalist, or a media company, it will be subject to the privileged protection set out above; to the contrary, if the expression comes from a nonmedia entity, it will, nonetheless, be subject to general freedom of expression The origins of the traditional media, and in particular the press industry, may well be founded on freedom of expression philosophy 57 , and the notion that, as the Fourth Estate, its primary function is to act as a 'public watchdog', 58 in that it operates as the general public's 'eyes and ears' by investigating and reporting abuses of power 59 . Prior to the evolution of the internet into a network available throughout the world and, in particular, the new media revolution, which transformed that network into an accessible form of mass media, creating an audience and producer convergence 60 , traditional press and broadcast (television or radio) companies were the only media institutions that had the ability to reach mass audiences through regular publication or broadcasts 61 .
Consequently, as observed by Leveson LJ in his Inquiry, in recent years, the traditional media, and in particular the press, has played a critical role in informing the public on matters of public interest and concern 62 . Furthermore, because of the traditional media's ability to reach so many people, for the purposes of media protection, it was relatively easy to distinguish between expression conveyed by a media entity, to that communicated by a private individual 63 .
However, in contrast to Leveson LJ's examples of high quality investigative public interest journalism 64 , there is no doubt that an increasing number of print and broadcast media outlets choose to engage with sexy stories that sell, as opposed to reporting on matters of public concern 65 ; a position that clearly correlates with the of new media, these approaches can no longer be relied upon to distinguish between media and non-media actors. As a result, this section will argue that although these approaches may once have been effective, they now lack merit and are, potentially, redundant.
(A) PRESS-AS-TECHNOLOGY MODEL
The dominant view in the US, based upon the press-as-technology model, is that the media should not be subject to any privileges or special duties 122 . Accordingly, there is no need to distinguish it at all and, as a result, this model does not provide the means to do so. This is because, so the press-as-technology movement argues, the Framers of the In addition to this argument, there are wider-reaching reasons why the press-astechnology model, and the resistance to defining the media and delineating between those who are subject to a right to media freedom over and above those that are simply entitled to the right to freedom of expression, are subject to criticism. This situation is paradigmatic of the over-inclusive interpretation of media expression 147 , as it captures virtually every internet publication, including, for instance, tweets by celebrity footballers. Furthermore,, clearly the appearance and quality of information available on the internet, and via social media, varies drastically 148 . Despite these inconsistencies, the mass audience approach would classify a casual tweet from Cristiano Ronaldo as being legally indistinguishable to a citizen journalist using their blog to report from a war zone. Therefore, it would be incorrect to classify all publications capable of reaching mass audiences as media: the internet, as a vehicle through which information can be conveyed, must not be confused with the media as a legal concept, just as the medium paper does not, necessarily, constitute the press 149 .
Consequently, it is imperative to identify diligent journalists operating within the media-as-a-constitutional-component, regardless of the form that takes, and distinguish these from media entertainment and other information.
(C) 'PROFESSIONALISED' PUBLISHER APPROACH presumption that a tabloid journalist reporting on a kiss-and-tell story should be subject to greater legal protection, under the auspices of media freedom, than a private citizen journalist diligently blogging from an area embroiled in conflict, merely because the former is remunerated by a media organisation, and is professionally trained and educated is unmeritorious and illogical 160 . The former could be classed as mere media entertainment; whilst the later is paradigmatic of the media-as-a-constitutionalcomponent concept.
THE MEDIA-AS-A-CONSTITUTIONAL-COMPONENT
The previous section has established the shortfalls of the traditional methods adopted by courts and scholars for distinguishing between media and non-media actors: they simply do not fit in the new media arena. Based on a combination of jurisprudence and scholarship, and by recourse to the philosophical rationales underpinning freedom of expression and the media, this section will attempt to formulate a functional media-as- Mill values open discussion and debate instrumentally and intrinsically 184 , and argues that there should be: 'freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological' 185 . Accordingly, the very existence of disagreement is critical to the health of society 186 and the type or quality of expression is irrelevant, as the 'usefulness of an opinion is itself a matter of opinion' and to make an assessment of quality is an 'assumption of infallibility' 187 . Thus, it appears that Mill 193 Schauer, above n 191, 15. 194 Wragg, above n 181, 372. 195 For further analysis see: Coe, above n 1, 13-14. 196 Prior to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 coming into force, a number of criminal offences and civil causes of action were applied to revenge porn. See: Coe, above n 1, 13-14. 197 Barendt above n 14, 8.
according to Barendt, whatever interpretation is adopted, the theory 'rests on shaky grounds' 210 for reasons that can be applied to both traditional and new media 211 .
Firstly, if the assertion that one statement is stronger than another (whether these statements are communicated via a tweet, or a post on Facebook or YouTube, or whether they are printed in a traditional newspaper) cannot be intellectually supported and defended, the notion of truth loses its integrity 212 , as history demonstrates:
falsehood frequently triumphs over truth, to the detriment of society 213 . Secondly, the theory assumes that recipients of the communication consider what they read or view within the context of the marketplace rationally; deciding whether to accept or reject it, based on whether it will improve their lifestyle, and society generally 214 . This assumption is unrealistic, and over-optimistic 215 . Both criticisms are pertinent to new media, which proliferates a huge amount of information that is poorly researched or simply untrue, yet has the potential to, and very often does, emerge as the dominant The argument is based on the individual liberty paradigm; that individuals must be able to express themselves 224 . Pursuant to this theory, freedom of expression is afforded protection, as it is integral to an individual's need for self-fulfilment and development 225 . Contrarily, suppression of expression is an affront to personal dignity 226 , as this undermines equality of respect afforded to individuals to exercise their moral powers of reason and rationality 227 . Consequently, if expression contributes to the speaker's values and visions, it should be subject to protection 228 .
Scholars such as Nimmer, Nestler and Fargo and Alexander argue that media expression, by virtue of constitutional functions, is far less significant under this individual autonomy concept was first advanced by Thomas Scanlon. It is based on a right to receive information, and a right to be free from governmental intrusion into the process of individual decision-making 233 . In contrast to the arguments advanced by
Nimmer et al, arguably, new media, and in particular social media, is better able to facilitate the free flow of information, at liberty from governmental and other constraints, compared to the traditional media, and can therefore aid the process of individual choice. Thus, the argument from self-fulfilment and the concept of autonomy play a role in distinguishing media from non-media actors, as they provide a premise for individuals to engage more fully with the democratic process and issues of public concern. As Schauer argues: '…it emphasizes freedom of speech as a principle embedded in a line of demarcation between the individual and the government' 234 . As a result, it shares characteristics with valuable features of the argument from democratic self-governance 235 .
(E) THE ARGUMENT FROM DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE
This argument is the most fashionable of the justifications in Western democracies 236 and is best suited to underpin new media and support the notion of the media-as-aconstitutional component. It is based on the premise that the predominant purpose of freedom of expression is to protect the right of citizens to understand political matters in order to facilitate and enable societal engagement with the political and democratic process 237 . Ultimately, an informed electorate is a prerequisite of democracy.
Therefore, 'there must be no constraints on the free flow of information and ideas' 238 .
According to Bork, speech regarding 'government behaviour, policy or personnel, whether…executive, legislative, judicial or administrative' 239 was the original subject that was perceived as being protected by the right to freedom of expression 240 .
However, the scope of this approach was seen as being overly restrictive 241 , as focusing purely on political expression to the exclusion of other matters of public interest gave rise to an 'old-fashioned distinction between public and private power' 242 .
Consequently, Alexander Meiklejohn, with whom this argument is now primarily associated 243 , argued for the substitution of political expression with the wider, and less restrictive notion of 'public discussion', relating to any matter of public interest, as opposed to expression linked purely to the casting of votes 244 Accordingly, education, philosophy and science, literature and the arts, and public discussions on public issues, are activities that will educate citizens for selfgovernment 249 .
Historically, due to its reach, it was incumbent upon the traditional media to disseminate matters of public interest, and to act as the public watchdog and Fourth
Estate; to provide a check and balance on government. Consequently, the ECtHR has consistently stated that media freedom provides one of the best means for the public to discover and form opinions about the ideas and attitudes of political leaders, and on other matters of general interest, and that the public has a right to receive this information 250 . However, this role can now be fulfilled by both the traditional media and, by virtue of new media, citizen journalists. Therefore, this argument helps to define the media by providing a clear delineation between media and non-media actors.
Pursuant to its 'public discussion' scope, this rationale underpins the media-as-aconstitutional-component concept, as it supports media freedom protection, beyond that afforded to private individuals pursuant to the right to freedom of expression, for any actor that contributes regularly and widely to the dissemination of matters of public interest and/or operates as a public watchdog.
(F) MEDIA PRIVILEGE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The prevailing sections have established that media freedom grants protection beyond that afforded by freedom of expression to media actors fulfilling the media-as-aconstitutional-component concept. However, media that, pursuant to this concept, is subject to these privileges, beyond private individuals, is also subject to duties and responsibilities in excess of those expected of non-media entities. As has been discussed throughout this article, the reach of both the traditional and new media, including citizen journalists, does not just enable it to fulfil its constitutional functions.
This power can be abused in equal measure. Due to the reach of the media, the potential impact of abuse of power is far greater than those emanating from private individuals.
The media is not just capable of invading private lives of individuals, or damaging reputations, but it can also shape and mislead public opinion.
Therefore, the argument from democratic self-governance endorses a two-tiered approach to media expression 251 . Firstly, public discussion should be protected.
However, if the expression is not of public interest, it should not be afforded the same level of protection compared to that which is of public concern. This includes speech primarily concerned with commercial or financial matters 252 , speech relating to private or intimate matters 253 , and hate speech 254 . Further, the argument from democratic selfgovernance rationale, and its public discussion ambit, dictates that the media's privileged protection, pursuant to it being a constitutional component, is subject to it acting ethically and in good faith, and publishing or broadcasting material that is based on reasonable research to verify the provenance of it and its sources. Incidentally, the only legal instruments that qualify the right to free speech or expression with express reference to these extra duties and responsibilities are Article 10(2) ECHR and Article 19(3) ICCPR. These qualification clauses apply to both media and non-media entities;
however, according to Oster, their main purpose is to provide member states with a tool to combat abuses of power by the media 255 .
Consequently, the privilege afforded to the media, deriving primarily from the wide ambit of the argument from democratic self-governance, is based upon a utilitarian, consequentialist and functional understanding of media freedom. The media-as-a-constitutional-component concept means that media actors are protected for disseminating matters of public interest, and operating as the public watchdog/Fourth estate, and therefore fulfilling functions beneficial to society. However, this protection carries with it the obligation to fulfil these functions. If it fails to do this, it relinquishes its protection and may be subject to criminal or civil liability. Firstly, an actor can begin publishing as non-media, and later become media once a certain level of work and content is achieved 258 . Secondly, an actor that regularly disseminates news to a significant body of the public can be a journalist 259 . Thirdly, just because an actor is a blogger/blog does not mean it cannot be considered as media.
Indeed, 'a blogger who regularly disseminates news to a significant body of the public can be a journalist' 260 . Fourthly, an actor that publishes a single news item would not qualify as media. Regular commitment to publishing new or recent information of public interest is required for, a blog for instance, to be considered news media.
However, the quantity of stories does not have to be equivalent to a corporate news organisation 261 . Finally, to determine whether an actor's work within the context of the medium makes them media, the following factors are relevant: (i) whether the receiving and disseminating of news through a news medium is regular; (ii) whether it involved significant time on a frequent basis; (iii) whether there was revenue derived from the medium; and (iv) whether it involved the application of journalistic skill 262 .
Based on the media-as-a-constitutional-component concept of media freedom that has been advanced throughout this article, it is suggested that an egalitarian principle should be adopted to define the media. This principle and its definition will focus on the functions that are performed by the media actors, as opposed to their inherent characteristics. Therefore, media freedom does not have to be a purely institutional privilege; it can apply to any actor that conforms to the definition. As a consequence of the requirement that these functions are fulfilled in order to satisfy the constitutional component concept, it will also give consideration to the obligations of the media. By applying the guidelines laid down in Slater, and scholarship and jurisprudence from both the US and Europe 263 , examined in prevailing sections, the following definition of media is proposed: (1) a natural and legal person (2) engaged in the process of gathering information of public concern, interest and significance (3) with the intention, and for the purpose of, disseminating this information to a section of the public on a regular basis (4) whilst complying with objective standards governing the research, newsgathering and editorial process. instance, the time spent researching stories and ensuring the provenance and reliability of information.
As the media's privileged protection is based upon the constitutional component concept, which derives from the argument from democratic self-governance, one of the fundamental requirements for determining that an actor is operating as part of the media is its contribution to matters of public interest. Oster's argument that for this requirement to be fulfilled it must occur periodically 264 is over-exclusive. Actors can fulfil the definition above, and operate as a constitutional component, on one-off occasions or on an ad-hoc basis 265 . This is particularly the case within a new media context, in which contributions to the public interest can be made via many different platforms.
Scholarship and jurisprudence from the US, England and Wales and the ECtHR suggests that this requirement could be met with differences of opinion. From a US scholarship perspective, it is likely to be opposed on a doctrinal basis, as content discrimination is not permitted under the First Amendment 266 . To the contrary however, according to Sunstein: '…it would be difficult to imagine a sensible system of free expression that did not distinguish among categories of speech in accordance with their importance to the underlying purposes of the free speech guarantee' 267 . Indeed, the US social changes' 270 ; more than 'mere curiosity or prurient interest' with the public having a 'genuine stake in knowing about the matter published' 271 . Similarly, the ECtHR's jurisprudence provides rich precedent supporting the public interest requirement. It has regularly referred to 'matters of general public interest' and 'matters of public concern' within a variety of different circumstances. The principle has been applied to, amongst many other things 272 : national and local level political speech and reporting 273 ; criticism of public administration and justice 274 ; abuse of police power 275 ; criticisms of businesses and those operating businesses 276 . Hence, according to the ECtHR, publishing material relating exclusively to private matters or on 'tawdry allegations'
and 'sensational and…lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person's strictly private life' and serving to entertain rather than educate is not in the public interest 277 .
These situations referred to by the ECtHR relate to mere entertainment, as opposed to the fulfilment of a constitutional function pursuant to the media-as-aconstitutional-component and the proposed definition. In such situations, a publisher is not fulfilling their constitutional function, or role as public watchdog within a democracy. Consequently, they should not be subject to the privileges attached to media freedom. Thus, this proposed definition of the media has the potential to exclude from media privileges actors that have, traditionally, been considered part of the media, and subject to the protection offered by media freedom, despite their purpose being to primarily treat 'the private lives of those in the public eye' as 'a highly lucrative commodity' by exposing aspects of people's private lives or engaging in entertainment and sensationalism. These actors and entities do not conform to the requirements of the definition by publishing material that contributes to the dissemination of matters of public interest.
